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Abstract
Recent evidence suggests that despite opening up a country for trade, the produc-
tivity gap between developed and emerging economies often does not close. This paper
examines credit constraints as one channel held responsible for hampering convergence.
Specifically, we extend a Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) type trade model with vari-
able mark-ups to allow for endogenous technology adoption. We consider a framework
with two countries that potentially differ with respect to credit market development.
Firms have the option to adopt a more efficient technology by paying some fixed cost.
A fraction of the fixed technology adoption cost has to be financed externally: in a
less developed credit market, the costs of external finance and thus the total costs of
technology adoption are higher. A reduction in trade costs raises demand abroad (pro
technology-adoption effect) but reduces demand at home because of import competition
(anti technology-adoption effect). We find that trade liberalization increases economic
performance, that is average productivity and technology adoption, in both countries
but that the productivity gap widens. Simulations show that the welfare gap widens
too. Opening up without sufficient access to external funding thus fails to promote
convergence.
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1 Introduction
Trade liberalization is one of the most common policy reforms recommended to emerging
countries in order to enhance economic development and close the productivity gap towards
more developed countries (Rodrik, 2006). Opening up to trade increases the market size for
exporters and stimulates investment in advanced technologies. Furthermore, incoming for-
eign firms foster competition and contribute to a more efficient allocation of resources across
firms. However, trade liberalization alone is not enough to ensure economic convergence.
A leading example is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between devel-
oped countries, the USA and Canada, and a developing country, Mexico, in 1994. In the
decade following NAFTA, GDP, exports and investment in Mexico increased but productiv-
ity disparities with respect to Canada and the USA did not diminish. One key constraint to
achieving convergence have been deficiencies in local credit markets. While large firms have
access to foreign financing, inadequate access to domestic credit prevents the vast majority
of firms, especially smaller and newer ones, from taking full advantage of the opportunities
offered by NAFTA (Lederman et al., 2005).
This paper explores credit constraints as one channel through which trade liberalization
might impede convergence between countries. We develop a heterogeneous-firm model of
international trade where firms decide whether or not to invest in a more efficient produc-
tion technology. More specifically, we introduce technology adoption into the Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) framework. A fraction of the cost of purchasing/renting the advanced
technology has to be financed externally. Therefore, the technology adoption decision is
related to credit market development. In particular, weak protection of creditor rights in-
creases the risk premium creditors require in order to break even in expected terms. We
then analyze the effects of trade liberalization on technology adoption, average productivity
and welfare in a two-country setting where the two countries potentially differ with respect
to credit market development.
We find that the fraction of firms adopting the advanced technology increases with trade
liberalization in both countries. In addition to the reallocation of output towards more
productive firms (selection effect of trade), there is thus a second source of productivity gains.
Technology upgrading and the reallocation of resources lead to higher average productivity
and welfare, as in Bustos (2011). However, if firms in one country face credit constraints,
the difference between the two countries with respect to the fraction of firms adopting the
advanced technology increases. Hence, productivity gains both through firm selection and
through technology adoption are lower. As a result, the increase in average productivity
in the country with a less developed credit market is lower: the productivity gap widens.
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Simulations show that the welfare gap between the two countries widens too.
This result has important policy implications. Unconditional trade liberalization that
reduces trade barriers without improving access to domestic credit fails to promote economic
convergence. First, credit constraints lead to a lower selection effect. Second, and more
importantly, credit constraints impact negatively on firms’ productivity gains from trade
liberalization. These firm-level productivity gains capture dynamic gains from trade and are
considered more important for long-term growth and convergence than the static gains from
resource reallocation (Lederman et al., 2005; Jaramillo and Lederman, 2006).
Our paper contributes to the literature by being, as far as we know, the first to analyze
in a theoretical model how credit constraints change the effects of opening up to trade on
technology upgrading, average productivity and welfare. Our model with credit constraints
draws a nuanced picture of the impact of trade liberalization on economic performance and
convergence. Studying trade liberalization between two countries that differ in their credit
market development we show that the financially less developed country gains through the
reallocation of output towards more productive firms and a higher fraction of firms using
the advanced technology. The resulting increase in average productivity, together with an
increase in imported products, leads to more product variety and lower prices. However,
inadequate access to credit prevents firms from taking full advantage of the larger export
market while facing severe import competition, in contrast to firms in the country with a
more developed credit market. Thus, while the economy as a whole becomes more affluent,
the competitiveness of the corporate sector relative to the more developed country declines.
These findings match empirical evidence from NAFTA: after the free trade agreement, Mex-
ico increased its GDP and its exports. However, due to institutional gaps, in particular
credit market development, the productivity gap with respect to the USA and Canada did
not close.
One advantage of our framework is that it captures both features of trade liberaliza-
tion, more export opportunities and increased import competition, in a direct way, by using
a heterogeneous-firm framework with endogenous mark-ups, without reducing tractability
compared to the standard constant-mark-up setup à la Melitz (2003). Consistent with em-
pirical evidence (e.g. Impullitti and Licandro, 2011; Feenstra and Weinstein, 2010; Tybout,
2003), endogenous mark-ups enable us to model the selection effect of trade liberalization
through increased import competition. This allows us to capture in a very intuitive way the
notion that credit constraints create asymmetries in the way firms benefit from improved
export opportunities, are hit by increased import competition, and may thus be more or less
inclined to invest in new technologies.
Our analysis builds on and contributes to two strands of the literature. First, it is related
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to previous research that examines the impact of trade liberalization on firm productivity.
Bernard et al. (2007) show that in the presence of heterogeneous firms, trade liberalization
induces larger productivity gains in comparative advantage industries. In our model, reallo-
cation forces are also larger in countries that have a comparative advantange in the financially
dependent sector. In addition, a reduction in trade barriers entails a second, empirically im-
portant, asymmetry : the difference in the fraction of advanced technology users increases
as well. Bustos (2011) and Navas-Ruiz and Sala (2007) introduce an endogenous technology
adoption decision into a Melitz (2003) framework with symmetric countries.1 Both papers
show that technology adoption increases after trade liberalization, leading to an increase in
average productivity in addition to the selection effect of trade. In contrast to these papers,
we explicitly consider the financing of technology adoption and allow for firms to be finan-
cially constrained. We show that this has important implications for economic convergence.
While technology adoption still increases in both countries after trade liberalization, credit
constraints prevent the financially less developed country from speeding up convergence.2
The second strand of the literature documents the negative impact of financial constraints
on firms’ ability to invest in innovation. Information asymmetry between firm and creditor,
moral hazard problems and lack of collateral reduce the access to external finance for invest-
ments in innovative activities (e.g. Hall and Lerner, 2009). The limited access to external
finance is likely to result in credit constraints if the credit market is not sufficiently devel-
oped. Potential credit market frictions in emerging countries are manifold (Levine, 2005).
First, the credit market is often not sufficiently competitive allowing creditors to charge lend-
ing rates that largely exceed marginal costs of financing credit. Second, employees without
adequate managerial skills and business ethics might increase monitoring costs and lay the
foundation for rent-seeking behavior. Moreover, a lack of “Basel Accords” -type recommen-
dations reduces transparency and increases information and transaction costs. Finally, the
legal environment in emerging countries often hampers financial contractibility and thereby
increases the costs of external finance (e.g. Manova, 2010). Alleviating financing constraints
of innovators therefore significantly boosts investment in more advanced technologies (for a
theoretical model see e.g. Keuschnigg and Ribi, 2010, for empirical evidence see e.g. Haji-
vassiliou and Savignac, 2007). Finally, our paper is related to Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer
(2012) who analyze the effect of financial constraints on the relation between exporting and
innovation using BEEPS data. They argue that exporting and technology adoption are nat-
ural complements but when internal funds are limited and external finance is costly, they
1Unel (2011) extends the Bustos framework to allow for asymmetric countries, with ambiguous results.
2Another strand of literature analyzes the dynamic interaction between exporting and innovation activities
(e.g. Atkeson and Burstein, 2010; Constantini and Melitz, 2008).
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find that engaging in one activity increases the costs of financing the other, and hence that
the joint observation of both exporting and innovation becomes less likely.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model setup. The equilibrium is
described in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the impact of trade liberalization and implications
for welfare are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section, we develop a model of the decision to export and to adopt an advanced
technology in the presence of credit constraints. In the model, firms are heterogeneous as
in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), and have the option to decrease their production cost by
investing in technology adoption, as in Bustos (2011). The costs of technology adoption
depend on credit market frictions. We consider two countries that potentially differ with
respect to credit market development. Variables of the foreign country, if different from the
variables of the home country, are denoted with a star.
2.1 Setup of the Model
Preferences. Each country consists of S consumers who have identical preferences over a
continuum of varieties indexed by i ∈ Ω and a homogeneous good chosen as numéraire
and indexed by 0 (p0 = 1). Preferences are described by the quasi-linear quadratic utility
function developed by Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002):
U = qc0 + α
∫
i∈Ω
qcidi−
1
2
γ
∫
i∈Ω
(qci )
2 di− 1
2
β
(∫
i∈Ω
qcidi
)2
, (1)
where α, β, γ > 0. qc0 and qci denote the per capita consumption level of the homogeneous
good and of each variety i. The parameters α and β characterize substitution between the
differentiated good and the numéraire good. The demand for differentiated varieties relative
to the numéraire increases as α increases or β decreases. The degree of product differentiation
is captured by the parameter γ. If γ = 0, varieties are perfectly substitutable and consumers
only care about their overall consumption level Qc =
∫
i∈Ω q
c
idi. As γ increases, consumers
increasingly prefer to distribute consumption across varieties. A price increase entails thus
a smaller drop in demand.
Utility maximization is with respect to the budget constraint Ic =
∫
i∈Ω′ piq
c
i + q
c
0 where
Ic is consumer’s income. Ω′ ⊂ Ω denotes the subset of varieties that are consumed in the
economy. Assuming that the demand for the numéraire good is positive (qc0 > 0), the demand
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for variety i is given by
qi ≡ Sqci =
αS
γ + βN
− S
γ
pi +
βN
γ + βN
S
γ
p¯. (2)
p¯ = (1/N)
∫
i∈Ω′ pidi is the average price and N the number of consumed varieties. Variety i
is consumed whenever the price pi is non-prohibitive:
pi ≤ pmax ≡ γα
γ + βN
+
βN
γ + βN
p¯, (3)
where pmax is the prohibitive price above which demand qi is equal to zero. Equations (2)
and (3) then imply a price elasticity of demand equal to
i =
(
pmax
pi
− 1
)−1
. (4)
Given the price pi, an increase in competition — a larger set of consumed varieties N or
a lower average price p¯ — raises the price elasticity i and decreases the mark-up, μi =
i/(i− 1). The mechanism behind this result is the following: an additional variety reduces
overall per-variety consumption and leads to a lower prohibitive price. The price elasticity
increases and mark-ups decrease. Likewise, a lower price index p¯, implying a higher relative
price pi/p¯, reduces demand for variety i and thereby the mark-up μi.
Hence, in contrast to the case of a CES demand function, higher product market compe-
tition leads to lower mark-ups when using the linear demand system specified in (2).
Supply. The only factor of production, labor, is inelastically supplied in a competitive
market. The market for the homogeneous good is perfectly competitive. Firms produce
at constant returns to scale and require one unit of labor to produce one unit of output.
Assuming a positive demand for the numéraire, the quasi-linear utility in (1) ensures labor
market equilibrium. Moreover, the nominal wage in each economy is then equal to unity.3
Firms in the differentiated good industry operate under monopolistic competition and take
the average price p¯ and the number of competitors N as given. Production is at constant
returns to scale with firm-specific labor requirement ci. The parameter ci thus reflects cost
differences across firms. In order to satisfy demand qi, firms need to hire li = ciqi units of
labor. In the following, we omit the subscript i for readability.
Entry requires a fixed investment fE. This investment is thereafter sunk and captures start-
up costs such as setting up a facility and buying equipment. Upon entry, firms draw their
3qc0 > 0 is satisfied if β is large enough. We make this assumption in the following.
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production cost from a common distribution G(c). When learning the cost of production,
firms decide (i) whether to exit the industry or to stay and produce and if they produce (ii)
whether to export and whether to invest in technology adoption.
Technology adoption. In our extension of the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) framework, firms
have the option of upgrading their technology by spending f units of labor. The technology
adoption cost f can be thought of as a per-period fixed cost that comes with adopting the
more advanced technology as for example the rent for new machinery or the periodized pur-
chasing cost. One way to think about technology upgrading is that it reduces production cost
by a fixed amount t: firms adopt a process innovation that reduces labor input requirement
to l = (c− t)q.4 We call t the “technological leap.” The advanced technology thus comes at
a higher fixed cost but increases productivity.5
Credit constraints. The fixed cost of adopting the more advanced technology is paid up-
front and cannot be covered by future revenues. Internal funds are not sufficient to cover the
investment and firms need to raise outside finance for a fraction d, d ∈ [0, 1) of the fixed cost
f . In an imperfect credit market, this need for credit implies additional costs of external
finance. We follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) in that the need for outside capital arises from
technological reasons and is thus the same for all firms in the differentiated good industry.
Following Manova (2010), we assume imperfect contract enforcement. Creditors are repaid
with probability λ, λ ∈ [0, 1). Hence, with probability (1 − λ) a firm defaults. Creditors
thus require a collateral that they can seize in case of default. We assume that a fraction
δ, δ ∈ (0, 1) of the capital and equipment required to start production (as captured by the
market entry costs fE) serves as collateral. Creditors recover only a fraction θ, θ ∈ (0, 1) of
the collateral as they incur liquidation costs (e.g. Schnitzer et al., 2009), e.g. because the
collateral good cannot be sold at the original price. Another reason might be that creditors
might need to invest time and effort in order to sell the collateral good because they do
not have sufficient knowledge of the industry. Creditors make firms a take-it-or-leave offer
specifying the required amount of repayment R. The credit market is perfectly competitive,
4Note that for cost draws c ∈ [0, t), this specification implies negative labor input. This can be ruled out
by restricting cost draws to c ≥ t. An alternative, but formally equivalent, interpretation of t is an increase
in the price margin through product innovation or the adoption of an advanced technology that increases
quality at unchanged cost. This interpretation does not require a restriction of cost draws and hence will be
alluded to in order to avoid limiting the cost distribution.
5Modelling a continuous investment decision, e.g. max π = tφ(p− c)q − t, instead of a binary one makes
the analysis cumbersome but leaves the results qualitatively unchanged: “opening up” reduces investment
of purely domestic firms and has a positive larger market and a negative import competition effect on the
investment of exporters.
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that is creditors break even in expected terms. The zero profit condition for creditors for a
credit of size df is given by
λR + (1− λ)θδfE ≥ df (5)
implying a repayment of
R =
d
λ
f − (1− λ)θ
λ
δfE.
6 (6)
Without advanced technology adoption, the total cost of production is given by
TC (c) = cq(c). (7)
The total cost function of firms using the advanced technology, TCA, depends on the level
of credit market frictions:
TCA (c) = (c− t)qA(c) + (1− d)f + λR + (1− λ)δfE = (c− t)qA(c) + f + fext, (8)
where fext = (1 − λ)(1 − θ)δfE. Lower contract enforcement, higher liquidation costs and
fewer tangible assets increase the costs of external finance and thereby the total costs of
technology adoption.
Exporting. Trade between countries involves trade costs that consist of a fixed (market
entry costs) and a variable component (transport costs, tariffs). Following Ottaviano et al.
(2009), we collapse all trade costs into a single indicator. The traditional formulation of
iceberg transport costs implies that more productive firms (those with lower cost draws)
have access to a lower cost transport technology. As a consequence, reallocation forces are
distorted (Schroeder and Sorensen, 2011; Irarrazabal et al., 2011). Therefore, we assume
per-unit trade costs, τ > 0.
2.2 Firm behavior
Prices and profits. Let pD, pX , pDA, pXA denote the price in the domestic and in the export
market of firms using the baseline technology and of firms using the advanced technology,
6We assume that f ≥ (1− λ)θδfE/d such that R ≥ 0.
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respectively. Profit maximization implies:
pD =
1
2
(pmax + c) , pX =
1
2
(p∗max + c + τ)
pDA =
1
2
(pmax + c− t) , pXA = 1
2
(p∗max + c + τ − t) .
Prices charged by firms using the advanced technology are lower, pDA = pD − t/2 and
pXA = pX− t/2. Accordingly, quantities sold are higher. Technology adoption increases thus
variable profits but involves fixed cost. The profits of firms serving only the domestic market
using the baseline and the advanced technology are given by:
πD =
S
4γ
(pmax − c)2 , πDA = S
4γ
(pmax − c + t)2 − f − fext. (9)
Profits of firms serving also the foreign market are respectively
π = πD + πX =
S
4γ
[
(pmax − c)2 + (p∗max − c− τ)2
]
πA = πDA + πXA =
S
4γ
[
(pmax − c + t)2 + (p∗max − c− τ + t)2
]− f − f ext. (10)
Firms’ sorting pattern. Denote with cD, cX , and cA the cost cutoffs below which firms stay
in the market and produce, serve the foreign market, and invest in technology adoption. A
number of empirical studies shows that only a subset of domestic producers serves the foreign
market and/or uses an advanced production technology, that is cX < cD and cA < cD (e.g.
Bernard and Jensen, 1999). Furthermore, there are two possible sorting patterns (Figure
1). In the first case (cA < cX), serving only the domestic market and using an advanced
Figure 1: Plausible sorting patterns
cA cX cDadvanced, exporter baseline, exporter baseline, domestic
cX cA cDadvanced, exporter advanced, domestic baseline, domestic
technology is always dominated by some other choice. This case obtains if the fixed cost
of technology adoption f is high. In the opposite case (cX < cA), the marginal technology
adopter is a purely domestic firm, that is all exporters use the advanced technology (low
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f). The technology adoption decision is then only indirectly affected by trade liberalization
whereas in the first case, opening up to trade affects this decision directly. Given the aim of
the paper, we therefore focus on the first case and assume that cA < cX < cD. The necessary
parameter restrictions are provided below.7 Thus, there are four types of firms. Firms with
a cost draw above cD immediately exit the market. Firms with marginal cost between cD
and cX are purely domestic producers and those with costs between cX and cA also serve
the foreign market. The most productive firms with production cost below cA adopt the
advanced technology and serve the foreign market.
Firm decisions. The least productive firms serve only the domestic market and use the
baseline technology. They decide to stay in the market and produce if their profits πD are
non-negative:
πD(cD) = 0 ⇔ cD = pmax. (11)
A lower entry cutoff cD reflects tougher selection and a more competitive market. Using
(11), profits described in (9) and (10) can be rewritten as
πD =
S
4γ
(cD − c)2
π = πD + πX =
S
4γ
[
(cD − c)2 + (c∗D − c− τ)2
]
πA = πDA + πXA =
S
4γ
[
(cD − c + t)2 + (c∗D − c− τ + t)2
]− f − fext. (12)
Firms export if they can profitably serve the foreign market. This is the case if their pro-
duction cost is below the export cutoff cX where
πX(cX) = 0 ⇔ cX = c∗D − τ. (13)
Exporters invest in technology adoption if their total profits are higher when using the
advanced technology, that is if πA (c) ≥ π (c). Technology adoption increases variable profits
but involves fixed costs. This trade-off is depicted in Figure 2. Firms with cost draws below
the technology adoption cutoff cA invest in technology adoption. Their scale of production
is very large so that it pays for them to bear the investment cost f + fext:
πA (cA) = π (cA) ⇔ cA = 1
2
(
cD + c
∗
D + t− τ −
2γ
St
ψf
)
, (14)
7Bustos (2011) and Lederman et al. (2005) provide empirical support for this assumption on firms’ sorting
pattern.
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cA cD
c
π, πA
π
πA
Figure 2: Technology adoption trade-off
where ψ = 1+ (1−λ)(1−θ)δfE
f
. Using (11), (13), and (14), we can now state a condition for our
assumption on firms’ sorting pattern:
fmin ≡ (cD − cX + t) St
2γψ
< f < (cD + cX + t)
St
2γψ
≡ fmax, (15)
where fmin and fmax describe the range of f as a function of ψ for which 0 < cA < cX < cD.8
Credit market frictions - imperfect contract enforcement, liquidation costs, lack of tangible
assets - decrease access to external finance and thereby increase the total costs of investment.
Hence, firms in a less developed credit market need to be more productive in order to have an
incentive to invest in technology adoption. This is reflected by a higher technology adoption
cutoff: dcA/dψ < 0. It follows that firms with cost draws c ∈ [( cA, cA(ψ = 1) ) would
invest in technology adoption in a perfect credit market but are prevented from doing so by
fext > 0. These are the missing high-technology firms.
2.3 Pareto distributed production cost
We assume that productivity (as implied by the cost draw) 1/c is Pareto distributed with
lower bound 1/cM and shape parameter k ≥ 1. It follows that marginal cost c is also Pareto
distributed with shape parameter k ≥ 1 and support [0, cM ]:
G(c) =
(
c
cM
)k
, c ∈ [0, cM ]. (16)
8Note that both cD and c∗D depend on τ, k, t, f, γ, ψ, S, fE , cM .
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The Pareto distribution has been intensively used in the recent literature as several studies
have suggested that it matches the firm size distribution (e.g. Axtell, 2001; Del Gatto et al.,
2006; Helpman et al., 2004). Furthermore, it makes the analysis highly tractable and easily
lends itself to interpretation. The upper bound on marginal cost cM indicates how cost
effective the economy is in producing the differentiated good. A higher cM implies higher
average cost of production. The shape parameter k governs the dispersion of the cost distri-
bution. If k = 1, G(c) corresponds to the uniform distribution. A higher k implies a higher
cost concentration and thus higher average cost of production. Moreover, any truncation of
the Pareto distribution is also a Pareto distribution with shape paramater k. The ex-ante
distribution of successful entrants is the Pareto distribution in (16) truncated at the entry
cutoff cD
GcD(c)
(
c
cD
)k
, c ∈ [0, cD]. (17)
From the law of large numbers (LLN), this is also the ex-post distribution of domestic
producers. The ex-ante probability of using the baseline and the advanced technology, con-
ditional on being a producer, is given by [G(cD)−G(cA)] /G(cD) and G(cA)/G(cD) respec-
tively. By the LLN, these expressions also represent the fraction of low-technology and
high-technology firms among domestic producers, NDL/ND and NDA/ND, where ND, NDL
and NDA denote the absolute number of domestic producers and of domestic low-technology
and high-technology firms.
The average cost of production (CoP ) of domestic firms is then given by
CoP =
NDA
ND
∫ cA
0
(c− t) g(c)
G(cA)
dc +
NDL
ND
∫ cD
cA
c
g(c)
G(cD)−G(cA)dc
=
k
k + 1
cD − t
(
cA
cD
)k
. (18)
In the following, we focus on the average cost of production as our (inverse) measure of
average productivity. As an alternative measure, we also consider aggregate cost where c
is weighted either by demand q(c) or by revenues r(c) as (inverse) measure of aggregate
productivity (see Proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix for analytical expressions of aggregate
cost).
3 Equilibrium Analysis
There is an unbounded mass of ex-ante identical firms who decide whether or not to enter
the differentiated good industry. Free entry into the industry ensures that ex-ante expected
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profits are zero in equilibrium: firms enter until ex-post expected profits correspond to the
fixed entry costs. The free entry condition is
fE =
∫ cA
0
πA (c) dF (c) +
∫ cX
cA
π (c) dF (c) +
∫ cD
cX
πD (c) dF (c).
And, solving the integral,
(cD)
k+2 + (c∗D − τ)k+2
k + 2
+ 2t (cA)
k+1 =
fE2γ (cM)
k (k + 1)
S
, (19)
where cA is given by (14). The free entry condition for the foreign country is analogous. Each
free entry condition will hold as long as there is a positive mass of domestic entrants NE > 0
(N∗E > 0). Otherwise, the respective country abandons the production of the differentiated
good and specializes in the numéraire.9
(19) describes a system of two equations with two unknowns (cD and c∗D). An equilibrium
in which both countries produce the differentiated good exists if and only if the solution of
(19), (cD, c∗D), takes positive and real values. Lemma 1 shows the conditions under which
this is the case. cD and c∗D cannot explicitly be solved for because (i) they enter cA and c∗A
additively and (ii) cA and c∗A enter in a nonlinear way. However, it is possible to show that
there is a unique equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Provided that ψ, for a given ψ∗, is not too large and thus the difference in
credit market development between home and foreign country is not too large, there is a
unique equilibrium pair of cD and c∗D.
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix.
This is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4: FE and FE∗ plot the free entry conditions of
the home and the foreign country in the (cD, c∗D) space. Figure 3 depicts the symmetric
equilibrium (ψ = ψ∗). In the symmetric case, the two countries share the same entry cutoff,
cD = c
∗
D = c
symm
D .
In the following, we assume that the home country has a less developed credit market.
Figure 4 shows the asymmetric equilibrium (ψ > ψ∗): higher costs of external finance cause
9NE =
{
(cM )
k
/
[
(cD)k(c∗D)
k − (cX)k(c∗X)
]} [
N (c∗D)
k −N∗ (c∗X)k
]
≤ 0 implies N∗E ={
(cM )
k
/
[
(cD)k(c∗D)
k − (cX)k(c∗X)
]} [
N∗ (cD)
k −N (cX)k
]
> 0. Hence, at most one country special-
izes in the numéraire. In the following analysis, we assume that NE > 0 and N∗E > 0.
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csymmD
cM
csymmD
cM
cD
c∗D
FE
FE∗
Figure 3: Open economy equilibrium: Symmetric countries
casymmD
cM
c∗asymmD
cM
cD
c∗D
FE
FE∗
Figure 4: Open economy equilibrium: Asymmetric countries
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an outward shift of the home country’s free entry condition curve. Compared to the sym-
metric case, the resulting equilibrium entry cutoff is lower in the foreign country and higher
in the home country, that is c∗asymmD < c
symm
D < c
asymm
D . Formally, this is reflected by the free
entry conditions described by (19). Higher costs of external finance make technology upgrad-
ing in the home country more expensive than in the foreign country. Some exporters who
use the advanced technology in the symmetric case now abstain from technology upgrading.
Therefore, ex-ante expected profits and firm entry are lower as reflected by a higher entry
cutoff. A higher entry cutoff implies softer selection: average productivity, that is average
competitiveness, is lower. The contrary holds for the foreign country.
cD > c
∗
D implies, by (13), that the export cutoff is lower in the home country. Fur-
thermore, the fraction of exporters, given by (cX/cD)
k, is lower. From (14) it follows that
the technology adoption cutoff and therefore the fraction of high-technology firms, given by
(cA/cD)
k, is also lower in the home country.
The following proposition summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 1. Suppose that fmin < f < fmax such that in equilibrium the following
order of cutoffs holds: 0 < cA < cX < cD. Suppose further that ψ > ψ∗. The fraction of ex-
porters, the fraction of high-technology firms and the average productivity of domestic firms
are higher in the foreign country. Furthermore, the larger the difference in credit market
development (ψ/ψ∗ increases), the larger the absolute and relative difference between the two
countries, that is:
•
d
[(
c∗X
c∗
D
)k
−
(
cX
cD
)k]
dψ
> 0,
d
[(
c∗A
c∗
D
)k
−
(
cA
cD
)k]
dψ
> 0,
d(CoP−CoP ∗)
dψ
> 0
•
d
[(
c∗X
c∗
D
)k
/
(
cX
cD
)k]
dψ
> 0,
d
[(
c∗A
c∗
D
)k
/
(
cA
cD
)k]
dψ
> 0,
d(CoP/CoP ∗)
dψ
> 0.
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix.
4 Trade liberalization
In the following, we study the effects of trade liberalization via a decrease in trade barriers
τ .10 As a benchmark case, we start by analyzing the symmetric case.
10This paper develops a static model. Trade liberalization is thus the comparative statics analysis of how
a situation with high trade barriers compares to a situation with lower trade barriers. However, as in Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008), the different situations can be interpreted as steady state equilibria.
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4.1 Benchmark: Symmetric countries
The impact of trade liberalization on the symmetric equilibrium is depicted in Figure 5.
cD, c
∗
D is the equilibrium before trade liberalization and c
′
D, c
∗′
D the equilibrium after trade
liberalization. A reduction in trade costs τ causes an inward shift of the free entry condition
curves. For a given entry cutoff in the foreign country, the entry cutoff in the home country
is now lower. The intersection of the two curves moves along the 45-degree line towards the
origin. Hence, in the new equilibrium, both entry cutoffs are lower. In the symmetric case,
c
′
D
cD cM
c∗
′
D
c∗D
cM
cD
c∗D
FE
FE∗
FE
′
FE∗
′
Figure 5: Trade liberalization: Symmetric countries
the free entry condition (19) reduces to
(cD)
k+2 + (cD − τ)k+2
k + 2
+ 2t (cA)
k+1 =
fE2γc
k
M(k + 1)
S
. (20)
From (20) we can derive that lower trade barriers τ imply higher expected profits and
therefore more entries and a lower entry cutoff (see Proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix):
dcD
dτ
> 0. (21)
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A reduction in trade costs lowers the delivered costs abroad and increases the foreign de-
mand for imports. Exporters thus serve a larger market abroad and realize higher profits.
However, import competition at home increases also, since lower trade costs increase the
competitiveness of foreign exporters. The least productive domestic producers start making
losses and exit the market. This is the well-known selection effect pointed out by Melitz
(2003): trade liberalization reallocates production to the most productive firms.
Differentiating the export cost cutoff (13) with respect to trade barriers τ , we obtain
dcX
dτ
=
dcD
dτ
− 1 < 0. (22)
Trade liberalization has two opposing effects on the export cost cutoff given by the first
and second term in (22). Lower trade barriers allow the most productive domestic firms to
start exporting (second term). On the other hand, trade liberalization increases competition
abroad and makes it more difficult to profitably export (first term). It can be shown that
the first effect dominates (see Proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix). Hence, as in standard
heterogenous-firm trade models, the export cutoff and the fraction of exporters, (cX/cD)
k,
increase after trade liberalization.
The novelty here is that we can also analyze the effect on the incentive to upgrade
technology. From the expression for the technology adoption cutoff (14), the impact of trade
liberalization on technology upgrading is given by
dcA
dτ
=
1
2
(
2
dcD
dτ
− 1
)
< 0. (23)
A reduction in trade barriers increases the market abroad and induces the most productive
low-technology firms to upgrade their technology. This larger market or pro technology-
adoption effect is reflected by the second term in the brackets. Trade liberalization increases
import competition and reduces market shares at home. The first term represents this anti
technology-adoption effect. The net effect of lower trade barriers on the technology adop-
tion cutoff is pro technology-adoption: total output of the most productive low-technology
firms increases. Therefore, these firms have a higher return to technology upgrading. Hence,
they now invest in the advanced technology. This is expressed by an increase in the tech-
nology adoption cutoff cA. The fraction of high-technology firms, (cA/cD)
k, increases as well.
Proposition 2. Suppose that fmin < f < fmax such that in equilibrium the following
order of cutoffs holds: 0 < cA < cX < cD. Suppose further that countries are identical. A
reduction in trade costs τ increases the fraction of exporters, the fraction of high-technology
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firms, and average productivity.11
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix.
4.2 Asymmetric countries
How do the results above change if the home country has a less developed credit market and
therefore higher costs of external finance? The intuition is best explained graphically (see
Proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix for analytical derivations). Figure 6 depicts the new
equilibrium.
c
′
D
cD cM
c∗
′
D
c∗D
cM
cD
c∗D
FE
FE∗
FE
′
FE∗
′
Figure 6: Trade liberalization: Asymmetric countries
A reduction in trade barriers still causes an inward shift of both free entry condition
curves. However, in contrast to the symmetric case, the entry cutoff in the home country
decreases less. The decrease in the entry cutoff in the foreign country, on the other hand,
is stronger and the more so the more severe the credit constraints in the home country are.
11If 0 < cX < cA < cD, the marginal technology adopter is a purely domestic firm. As trade liberalization
reduces domestic production, only the anti-technology adoption effect is at work and the technology adoption
cutoff unambiguously decreases.
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Hence, dcD/dτ < dc∗D/dτ . The reason for this is, as will be shown in the following, that
the (initial) export and technology adoption cutoff are higher in the foreign country. Put
differently, the (initial) fraction of exporters and high-technology firms is higher and more
firms can take advantage of the larger export market after trade liberalization. Therefore,
ex-ante expected profits and entry increase more in the foreign country implying a stronger
selection effect.
The effect of trade liberalization on the export cost cutoff is given by
dcX
dτ
=
dc∗D
dτ
− 1 < 0, dc
∗
X
dτ
=
dcD
dτ
− 1 < 0.
Hence, the export cutoff and the fraction of exporters increase in both countries if τ decreases.
Moreover, it can be shown that the difference between the two countries with respect to the
fraction of exporters increases as τ decreases:
d
[(
c∗X
c∗D
)k
−
(
cX
cD
)k]
dτ
< 0. (24)
The effect of trade liberalization on the technology adoption cutoff (and hence, on the
fraction of high-technology firms) is positive:
dcA
dτ
=
dc∗A
dτ
=
1
2
(
dcD
dτ
+
dc∗D
dτ
− 1
)
< 0. (25)
The first term in the brackets describes again the import competition or anti technology-
adoption effect and the second term the larger market or pro technology-adoption effect.
The anti technology-adoption effect reflects the increase in competition in the home and in
the foreign market after trade liberalization. Since high-technology firms belonging to either
country are active in both markets, it is the same for both countries. It decreases in the
entry cutoffs cD and c∗D, that is the strength of this effect depends on the initial (before trade
liberalization) level of these cutoffs: for a given increase in ex-post expected profits, the en-
try cutoff cD has to decrease the more, the lower it was initially, in order to satisfy the free
entry condition. The pro technology-adoption effect is also the same for both countries.12
Hence, the marginal increase in the technology adoption cutoff after trade liberalization is
identical across countries and the difference in the technology adoption cutoffs cA and c∗A is
unchanged, d (c∗A − cA) /dτ = 0. This implies that the percentage increase, (dcA/dτ)/cA, is
higher in the home country.
12This is due to the per-unit specification of trade costs (τ enters cA additively).
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We are interested in particular in the impact on the fraction of high-technology firms,
(cA/cD)
k and (c∗A/c∗D)
k, as an indicator of the average technology level of home and for-
eign country. The increase in the technology adoption cutoff is the same in both countries.
The selection effect, however, is larger in the foreign country, that is c∗D decreases more
than cD. Therefore, the difference in the fraction of firms that use the advanced technology
increases as τ decreases:
d
[(
c∗A
c∗D
)k
−
(
cA
cD
)k]
dτ
< 0. (26)
From (18), average cost of production (our main (inverse) measure of productivity) in home
and foreign country is given by
k
k + 1
cD − t
(
cA
cD
)k
,
k
k + 1
c∗D − t
(
c∗A
c∗D
)k
.
A stronger selection effect in the foreign country implies a larger decrease in the average cost
draw, that is in average production cost of low-technology firms (first term). Moreover, from
(26), the difference between the two countries in terms of the fraction of high-technology
firms is even larger after trade liberalization (second term). Hence, average productivity
increases more in the foreign country: trade liberalization widens the average productivity
gap. This is summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3. Suppose that fmin < f < fmax such that in equilibrium the following
order of cutoffs holds: 0 < cA < cX < cD. Suppose further that ψ > ψ∗. A reduction in trade
costs τ increases the fraction of exporters, the fraction of high-technology firms, and average
productivity in both countries. However, the absolute difference between the two countries
with respect to the fraction of exporters, the fraction of high-technology firms, and average
productivity increases as well. Furthermore, the relative average productivity increases:
•
d
[(
c∗X
c∗
D
)k
−
(
cX
cD
)k]
dτ
< 0,
d
[(
c∗A
c∗
D
)k
−
(
cA
cD
)k]
dτ
< 0,
d(CoP−CoP ∗)
dτ
< 0
• d(CoP/CoP ∗)
dτ
< 0.
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix.
The impact of a reduction in τ on the relative difference between the two countries with
respect to the fraction of exporters and the fraction of high-technology firms cannot be de-
termined analytically. For our parametrization introduced in section 5, we can show that
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the relative difference increases after trade liberalization (see Table 6 in the Appendix). In
addition, we consider a measure of aggregate productivity which corresponds to the cost
of production weighted either by demand q(c) or by revenues r(c). The impact of trade
liberalization on the aggregate productivity gap can be analyzed only numerically. We do
this in section 5.
Thus, trade liberalization increases economic performance, average productivity and the
adoption of advanced technologies, in both countries. However, a reduction in trade costs -
without improved access to credit - is not enough to ensure convergence between home and
foreign country. Credit market deficiencies prevent the home country to take full advantage
of the opportunities offered by trade liberalization. First, as fewer firms can take advantage
of the larger export market, the selection effect is less severe. Hence, efficiency gains through
resource allocation from less to more productive firms are lower. Second, while a reduction in
trade costs increases the adoption of advanced technologies, the gap with respect to the frac-
tion of high-technology firms, does not close. For both reasons, relative average productivity
of the country with a developed credit market increases.
5 Welfare analysis
In the following, we parametrize the model to conduct a welfare analysis.
5.1 Parametrization
The parameters representing trade costs (τ), industry cost effectiveness (k), technological
leap (t) and product differentiation (γ) are taken from empirical studies and calibrations to
connect the model to real data. We allow τ ∈ [0.7, 1] as this reduction of 30% corresponds
to the typical reduction in trade costs in the industries most affected by trade liberalization
(Constantini and Melitz, 2008). Del Gatto et al. (2006) estimate k = 2 across 18 industries
in 11 Western European countries. In line with Bernard et al. (2003), Behrens et al. (2007)
calibrate k = 3.6. We set k = 2.5. The technological leap t is set to 0.5 which corresponds
to 10% of the average cost of production in our basic specification below. This is in line with
Constantini and Melitz (2008), who calibrate a model of trade liberalization and technology
adoption. Finally, Ottaviano et al. (2009) estimate the degree of product differentiation in
12 industries using data on 12 EU countries for the years 2001–2003. Calculating the average
across all industries, we use γ = 0.2.
Entry costs (fE), the upper bound on marginal cost (cM), and market size (S), are scale
parameters that are chosen to be in line with our assumption about the cutoff ranking,
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namely
0 < cA < cX < cD < cM . (27)
The range of parameter values to measure credit market development (ψ, ψ∗) is selected to
satisfy (27), qc0 > 0, NE > 0 and N∗E > 0 and to allow for a large enough difference in the total
technology adoption costs between the two countries. In particular, S = 1, fE = 10 = cM ,
ψ, ψ∗ ∈ [1, 1.25]. Furthermore, the fixed cost of technology adoption is set to f = 10.
Our preferred specification ("basic specification") is given by
• τ = 0.8
• k = 2.5
• t = 0.5
• γ = 0.2.
5.2 Welfare analysis
We use the indirect utility function associated with (1) to analyze the implications for social
welfare (see Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), p. 298):
W = Ic +
N
γ
σ2p
2
+
1
2
( γ
N
+ β
)−1
(α− p¯)2 . (28)
Welfare increases with an increase in the number of varieties sold in the market (N) and in
the price variance (σ2p), and decreases with an increase in the average price (p¯).
The average price in the open economy is
p¯ =
2k + 1
2(k + 1)
cD −
(
p− pA) NA
N
+
(
pX − p)
k + 1
N∗X
N
, (29)
where the first term gives the average price of low-technology firms and the second term
the price difference between low- and high-technology firms weighted by the share of high-
technology sellers in the economy. The share of high-technology firms is the sum of the
share of domestic NDA/N and of foreign high-technology firms N∗XA/N . The third term
corresponds to difference between export and domestic prices weighted with the share of
foreign firms in the economy. Because of tougher selection (lower cD), the average price
of low-technology firms is lower in the foreign country (first term). The fraction of high-
technology sellers and the fraction of foreign firms might be higher in either country. Hence,
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Home Foreign
NA/N 0.1822 0.1608
N∗X/N 0.8086 0.1231
p¯ 7.0329 6.81622
N 1.7286 1.9592
σ2p 0.7661 0.8330
W 1.1882 1.2203
Table 1: (τ = 0.8, t = 0.5, k = 2.5, γ = 0.2, S = 1, f = fE = cM = 10, ψ = 1.25)
it is a priori unclear if the average price is higher in the home country or in the foreign
country.
The number of firms in each country is given by:
N =
α
β
(α−cD)c∗D
2(k+1) +
t
2
1
D
[
(cD)
k (c∗A)
k − (c∗X)k (cA)k
]
α
β (c
∗
D − cD) + αβ τ(cX∗)
k
2D(k+1)
[
(α− cD) (cX)k + (α− c∗D) (cD)k
]
cDc∗D
4(k+1)2 +
t
4(k+1)DΔ +
tτ
4D(k+1)Θ
,
(30)
where
D =(cD)
k (c∗D)
k − (cD − τ)k (c∗D − τ)k
Δ =cD
{
(cD)
k (c∗A)
k − (c∗X)k
[
(cA)
k − τ(cX)
k
t(k + 1)
]}
+ c∗D
{
(c∗D)
k (cA)
k − (cX)k
[
(c∗A)
k − τ(c
∗
X)
k
t(k + 1)
]}
Θ =
[
(cX)
k (c∗A)
k + (c∗X)
k (cA)
k − τ (cX)
k (c∗D)
k
t(k + 1)
]
.
The price variance σ2p is the sum of the price variances of domestic and foreign sellers weighted
with their shares in the total population of sellers:
σ2p =
ND
N
σ2p,dom +
NX
N
σ2p,exp. (31)
We use the basic specification above to assess the overall impact of credit constraints
on average price, number of sellers, price variance, and welfare. Table 1 shows that the
fraction of high-technology sellers NA/N is higher in the home country. This is due to the
large fraction of high-technology firms that export from the foreign to the home country.
However, a higher average price of low-technology firms leads to a higher average price and,
together with a lower number of sellers, to lower welfare in the home country.
We next use the basic specification to study the effect of a 5%-decrease in trade costs
τ on welfare in the two countries. Table 2 shows the simulation results for welfare and the
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τ p¯ p¯∗ N N∗ σ2p
(
σ2p
)∗
W W ∗
1.0000 7.0922 6.9202 1.7094 1.8904 0.7692 0.8270 1.1825 1.2075
0.9500 7.0771 6.8956 1.7150 1.9065 0.7683 0.8280 1.1840 1.2105
0.9025 7.0629 6.8715 1.7199 1.9224 0.7675 0.8292 1.1854 1.2134
0.8574 7.0495 6.8477 1.7241 1.9382 0.7668 0.8307 1.1867 1.2164
0.8145 7.0371 6.8243 1.7276 1.9538 0.7663 0.8324 1.1878 1.2193
0.7738 7.0255 6.8013 1.7302 1.9693 0.7659 0.8343 1.1889 1.2222
0.7351 7.0147 6.7786 1.7321 1.9846 0.7656 0.8364 1.1899 1.2252
τ p¯/p¯∗ N/N∗ σ2p/
(
σ2p
)∗
W/W ∗
1.0000 1.0249 0.9043 0.9301 0.9793
0.9500 1.0263 0.8996 0.9279 0.9781
0.9025 1.0279 0.8947 0.9256 0.9769
0.8574 1.0295 0.8895 0.9231 0.9756
0.8145 1.0312 0.8842 0.9206 0.9742
0.7738 1.0330 0.8786 0.9181 0.9728
0.7351 1.0349 0.8727 0.9154 0.9712
Table 2: Impact of a 5%-decrease in trade costs on welfare
(t = 0.5, k = 2.5, γ = 0.2, S = 1, f = fE = cM = 10, ψ = 1.25)
three variables that determine welfare (p¯, N , σ2p).
A reduction in trade costs τ increases the number of varieties in both countries. However,
N increases less than N∗. The average price decreases in both markets but it decreases more
in the foreign country. The price variance that positively affects welfare increases more in
the foreign country. Hence, welfare increases in both countries but the welfare increase is
larger in the foreign country. The welfare gap between the two countries thus widens.
From section 4.2, we know that the average productivity gap increases, too. Table 3 shows
the simulation results for aggregate production cost, our (inverse) measures of aggregate
productivity, where CoP q, CoP ∗q denotes weighting with demand q(c) and CoP r, CoP ∗r
describes weighting by revenues r(c). Both measures of aggregate production cost decrease
after trade liberalization and more so in the foreign country, that is relative aggregate costs
increase. We interpret this result as an increase in the aggregate productivity gap.
6 Conclusion
Even though recommended to many developing countries, only if certain conditions are
met does opening up to trade enhance economic convergence. This paper examines the
role of credit market imperfections as a reason for a potentially detrimental effect of trade
liberalization on convergence. In particular, we introduce the possibility of investing in a
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Average productivity Aggregate productivity
τ CoP CoP ∗ CoPq CoP ∗q CoPr CoP ∗r
1.0000 5.8301 5.6914 26.3507 25.3051 177.0300 165.1811
0.9500 5.8183 5.6737 26.244 25.1547 175.9566 163.6664
0.9025 5.8071 5.6565 26.1434 25.0084 174.9478 162.1963
0.8574 5.7966 5.6398 26.0491 24.8658 174.0027 160.7685
0.8145 5.7867 5.6233 25.9609 24.7267 173.1202 159.3807
0.7738 5.7775 5.6073 25.8786 24.5911 172.2992 158.0304
0.7351 5.7690 5.5915 25.8023 24.4585 171.5386 156.7151
τ CoP/CoP ∗ CoPq/CoP ∗q CoPr/CoP ∗r
1.0000 1.0244 1.0413 1.0717
0.9500 1.0255 1.0433 1.0751
0.9025 1.0266 1.0454 1.0786
0.8574 1.0278 1.0476 1.0823
0.8145 1.0291 1.0499 1.0862
0.7738 1.0304 1.0524 1.0903
0.7351 1.0317 1.0549 1.0946
Table 3: Impact of a 5%-decrease in trade costs on productivity
(t = 0.5, k = 2.5, γ = 0.2, S = 1, f = fE = cM = 10, ψ = 1.25)
more efficient technology into a two-country heterogeneous-firm model with variable mark-
ups. The two countries may differ with respect to credit market development: in the less
developed country, firms face credit constraints and therefore higher costs of technology
upgrading. As a consequence, credit constrained firms cannot take advantage of the larger
market to the same extent but face fiercer increased import competition. Therefore, the
difference between the two countries with respect to the fraction of domestic firms that invest
in advanced technology increases. Hence, the productivity gap between the two countries
widens. Moreover, our simulations show that the welfare gap also increases after trade
liberalization.
Our focus is on the interplay of trade liberalization and credit market frictions because
credit market deficiencies are a major obstacle to achieving convergence. However, our model
could naturally be extended to the analysis of other market imperfections.
Our results have important policy implications. Trade liberalization fosters convergence
if and only if firms in emerging countries have equal access to external finance. In order
to reduce the productivity gap, a reduction in trade barriers must thus be accompanied
by credit market development. In our model, small and medium-sized firms might have an
incentive to invest in technology adoption but are prevented from doing so by high costs of
external finance. Policies aimed at increasing the access of smaller firms to external finance
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are therefore expected to have a strong effect.
Our model has abstracted from several important considerations. First, we assume a
quasi-linear utility function that allows normalizing the wage to unity. In doing so, we ignore
the effect that trade liberalization might have on (relative) wages (e.g. Bustos, 2011). Second,
we abstract from the possibility that firms serve the foreign market through foreign direct
investment. An interesting extension would thus be to include knowledge spillovers from
foreign to domestic producers. Third, we focus on technology adoption and do not consider
product innovation. However, following Atkeson and Burstein (2010), we can interpret entry
into the differentiated good industry as product innovation. Our model then shows that
trade liberalization increases the divergence between developed and less developed country
in product innovation activity.
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Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Totally differentiating (19) respectively yields the slopes of the free entry conditions of the
home country and of the foreign country in the (cD, c∗D) space:
Slope FE :
dc∗D
dcD
= − (cD)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (cA)
k
(c∗D − τ)k+1 + t(k + 1) (cA)k
Slope FE∗ :
dc∗D
dcD
= −(cD − τ)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (c∗A)
k
(c∗D)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (c∗A)
k
. (A.1)
Both curves are downward sloping. From our assumption that cX < cD follows that
(cX)
k < (cD)
k. The slope of FE is unambiguously larger than one and the slope of FE∗
is unambiguously smaller than one. Hence, there is a unique intersection if the two curves
intersect.
For given (ψ, ψ∗) let cD(1) denote the solution to home’s free entry condition for c∗D = cM .
Furthermore, denote with ψ¯ the value of ψ, given ψ∗, for which (cD(1), cM) is the solution
to foreign’s free entry condition. It follows that for ψ < ψ¯ and, by symmetry, for ψ∗ < ψ¯ the
two curves intersect.
Proof of Proposition 1
Entry cutoffs
The RHS of the two free entry conditions is identical. For a given entry cutoff in the other
country, (i) the LHS monotonously increases in the own entry cutoff and (ii) the LHS of (19)
is larger in the foreign country. Therefore, c∗D < cD.
Average productivity
From (18) the average cost of domestic firms, our (inverse) measure of average productivity,
are
CoP =
k
k + 1
cD − t
(
cA
cD
)k
. (A.2)
Since c∗D < cD and, from (14), c∗A > cA, CoP
∗
< CoP , that is average productivity is higher
in the foreign country.
Aggregate production cost is obtained by weighting production cost either with output q(c)
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or with revenues r(c):
CoPq =
NDA
ND
∫ cA
0
(c− t)qA(c) g(c)
G(cA)
dc +
NDL
ND
∫ cD
cA
cq(c)
g(c)
G(cD)−G(cA)dc
=
S
2γ
{
k(cD)
2
(k + 1)(k + 2)
− t
(
cA
cD
)k [
cD − 2k
k + 1
cA + t
]}
(A.3)
CoPr =
NDA
ND
∫ cA
0
(c− t)rA(c) g(c)
G(cA)
dc +
NDL
ND
∫ cD
cA
cr(c)
g(c)
G(cD)−G(cA)dc
=
S
4γ
{
2k(cD)
3
(k + 1)(k + 3)
− t (cA)
k
(cD)k−2
− t
2k(cA)
k+1
(k + 1)(k + 2)(cD)k
[(k + 2)− (k + 1)cA] + t3
}
.
(A.4)
Fraction of exporters and high-technology firms
From (13) and (14) follows directly that
(
cX
cD
)k
<
(
c∗X
c∗D
)k
and
(
cA
cD
)k
<
(
c∗A
c∗D
)k
: the fraction
of exporters and high-technology firms is larger in the foreign country.
Divergence
Totally differentiating (19) yields dcD
dψ
> 0 and dc
∗
D
dψ
< 0. Intuitively, given ψ∗, an increase
in ψ lowers (increases) ex-ante expected profits in the home (foreign) country leading to
less (more) entry and hence to a higher (lower) entry cutoff. Furthermore, dcX
dψ
=
dc∗D
dψ
< 0,
dc∗X
dψ
= dcD
dψ
> 0, dcA
dψ
= dcD
dψ
+
dc∗D
dψ
− 2γf
St
< 0 and dc
∗
A
dψ
= dcD
dψ
+
dc∗D
dψ
> 0. It follows that
CoP − CoP ∗,
(
c∗X
c∗D
)k
−
(
cX
cD
)k
and
(
c∗A
c∗D
)k
−
(
cA
cD
)k
increase. Moreover:
d
[(
c∗X
c∗D
)k
/
(
cX
cD
)k]
dψ
=k
(
c∗XcD
c∗DcX
)k [cD dc∗Xdψ + c∗X dcDdψ ] c∗DcX − [cX dc∗Ddψ + c∗D dcXdψ ] cDc∗X
(c∗DcX)
2
=k
(
c∗XcD
c∗DcX
)k (cD + c∗X) dcDdψ c∗DcX − (cX + c∗D) dc∗Ddψ cDc∗X
(c∗DcX)
2 > 0
d
[(
c∗A
c∗D
)k
/
(
cA
cD
)k]
dψ
=k
(
c∗AcD
c∗DcA
)k [cD dc∗Adψ + c∗A dcDdψ ] c∗DcA − [cA dc∗Ddψ + c∗D dcAdψ ] cDc∗A
(c∗DcA)
2
=k
(
c∗AcD
c∗DcA
)k [cD (dcDdψ + dc∗Ddψ )+ c∗A dcDdψ ] c∗DcA − [cA dc∗Ddψ + c∗D (dcDdψ + dc∗Ddψ − 2γfSt )] cDc∗A
(c∗DcA)
2 > 0
d
(
CoP/CoP ∗
)
dψ
=
[
k
k+1
dcD
dψ − tk
(
cA
cD
)k−1 dcA
dψ cD−
dcD
dψ cA
(cD)
2
]
CoP ∗
(
CoP
)2 −
[
k
k+1
dc∗D
dψ − tk
(
c∗A
c∗D
)k−1 dc∗A
dψ c
∗
D−
dc∗D
dψ c
∗
A
(c∗D)
2
]
CoP
(
CoP
)2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
27
Fraction of exporters and high-technology firms
In the symmetric case, ψ = ψ∗. The free entry condition (19) reduces to:
(cD)
k+2 + (cD − τ)k+2
k + 2
+ 2t (cA)
k+1 =
fE2γc
k
M(k + 1)
S
. (A.5)
Totally differentiating (A.5) yields
dcD
dτ
=
(cD − τ)k+1 + t(k + 1) (cA)k
(cD)
k+1 + (cD − τ)k+1 + 2t(k + 1) (cA)k
. (A.6)
cX then decreases in τ :
dcX
dτ
=
dcD
dτ
− 1 < 0
↔ − (cD)k+1 − t(k + 1) (cA)k < 0.
Since cD increases in τ , the fraction of exporters, given by
(
cX
cD
)k
unambiguously decreases
in τ .
cA decreases in τ
dcA
dτ
=
1
2
(
2
dcD
dτ
− 1
)
< 0
↔ (cD − τ)k+1 − (cD)k+1 < 0.
The fraction of high-technology firms also unambiguously decreases in τ .
Proof of Proposition 3
Entry cutoffs
Totally differentiating the free entry conditions yields the following expressions:
dcD
dτ
=
[
(cX)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (cA)
k
] [
(c∗D)
k+1 − (c∗X)k+1
]
[
(cD)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (cA)
k
] [
(c∗D)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (c∗A)
k
]
−
[
(cX)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (cA)
k
] [
(c∗X)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (c∗A)
k
]
dc∗D
dτ
=
[
(c∗X)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (c∗A)
k
] [
(cD)
k+1 − (cX)k+1
]
[
(c∗D)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (c∗A)
k
] [
(cD)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (cA)
k
]
−
[
(c∗X)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (c∗A)
k
] [
(cX)
k+1 + t(k + 1) (cA)
k
] .
(A.7)
Hence, dcD
dτ
> 0, dc
∗
D
dτ
> 0, and dcD
dτ
<
dc∗D
dτ
. Moreover, dcD
dτ
+
dc∗D
dτ
< 1.
Average productivity, fraction of exporters and high-technology firms
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From (A.7) follows that dcX
dτ
=
dc∗D
dτ
− 1 < 0, dc∗X
dτ
= dcD
dτ
− 1 < 0. Moreover, dcA
dτ
=
dc∗A
dτ
=
1
2
(
dcD
dτ
+
dc∗D
dτ
− 1
)
< 0.
It follows that the difference between the countries with respect to average productivity of
domestic firms, the fraction of exporters and the fraction of high-technology firms decreases
in τ .
Moreover:
d
[(
c∗X
c∗D
)k
/
(
cX
cD
)k]
dτ
=k
(
c∗XcD
c∗DcX
)k [cD dc∗Xdτ + c∗X dcDdτ ] c∗DcX − [cX dc∗Ddτ + c∗D dcXdτ ] cDc∗X
(c∗DcX)
2 >< 0
d
[(
c∗A
c∗D
)k
/
(
cA
cD
)k]
dτ
=k
(
c∗AcD
c∗DcA
)k [cD dc∗Adτ + c∗A dcDdτ ] c∗DcA − [cA dc∗Ddτ + c∗D dcAdτ ] cDc∗A
(c∗DcA)
2 >< 0
d
(
CoP/CoP ∗
)
dτ
=
[
k
k+1
dcD
dτ − tk
(
cA
cD
)k−1 dcA
dτ cD−
dcD
dτ cA
(cD)
2
]
CoP
∗
(
CoP
∗)2 −
[
k
k+1
dc∗D
dτ − tk
(
c∗A
c∗D
)k−1 dc∗A
dτ c
∗
D−
dc∗D
dτ c
∗
A
(cD∗ )2
]
CoP(
CoP
∗)2
=
k(
CoP ∗
)2
(k + 1)
[
dcD
dτ
CoP ∗ − dc
∗
D
dτ
CoP
]
− tk(
CoP ∗
)2
{
dcA
dτ
[(
cA
cD
)k−1
CoP
∗
cD
−
(
c∗A
c∗D
)k−1
CoP
c∗D
]
−
[(
cA
cD
)k
CoP
∗
cD
dcD
dτ
−
(
c∗A
c∗D
)k
CoP
c∗D
dc∗D
dτ
]}
< 0. (A.8)
Welfare Analysis
Average price
The average price of varieties sold in the home country is the sum of the average price
of domestic and the average price of foreign sellers weighted with their share in the total
population of sellers:
p¯ =
ND
N
p¯dom +
N∗X
N
p¯∗exp, (A.9)
where N , ND and N∗X are the total number of sellers, the number of domestic sellers and
the number of foreign sellers in the home country. The average price in the foreign country
is analogous.
Moreover:
(1) The number of sellers in each market is the sum of domestic and foreign sellers:
N = G (cD)NE + G (c
∗
X)N
∗
E
N∗ = G (c∗D)N
∗
E + G (cX)NE. (A.10)
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(A.10) can be solved for the number of entrants NE and N∗E:
NE =
(cM)
k
(cD)
k (c∗D)
k − (cD − τ)k (c∗D − τ)k
[
N (c∗D)
k −N∗ (cD − τ)k
]
N∗E =
(cM)
k
(cD)
k (c∗D)
k − (cD − τ)k (c∗D − τ)k
[
N∗ (cD)
k −N (c∗D − τ)k
]
. (A.11)
Using (A.11), the fraction of domestic and foreign producers is then
ND
N
=
1
(cD)
k (c∗D)
k − (cD − τ)k (c∗D − τ)k
[
(cD)
k (c∗D)
k − N
∗
N
(cD)
k (cD − τ)k
]
N∗X
N
=
1
(cD)
k (c∗D)
k − (cD − τ)k (c∗D − τ)k
[
N∗
N
(cD − τ)k (cD)k − (cD − τ)k (c∗D − τ)k
]
.(A.12)
(2) The average price of domestic sellers is the sum of the average price of domestic low- and
high-technology firms weighted with their share in the total population of domestic sellers,
NDL
ND
= G(cD)−G(cA)
G(cD)
and NDA
ND
= G(cA)
G(cD)
:
p¯dom =
NDA
ND
∫ cA
0
pDA
g(c)
G (cA)
dc +
NDL
ND
∫ cD
cA
pD
g(c)
G (cD)−G (cA)dc
=
2k + 1
2(k + 1)
cD − t
2
(
cA
cD
)k
. (A.13)
Analogously, the average price of foreign sellers is the sum of the average price of foreign
low- and high-technology firms weighted with their share in the total population of foreign
sellers, N
∗
XL
N∗X
=
G(c∗X)−G(c∗A)
G(c∗X)
and N
∗
XA
N∗X
=
G(c∗A)
G(c∗X)
,:
p¯∗exp =
N∗XA
N∗X
∫ c∗A
0
p∗XA
g(c)
G (c∗A)
dc +
N∗XL
N∗X
∫ c∗X
c∗A
p∗X
g(c)
G (c∗X)−G (c∗A)
dc
=
2k + 1
2(k + 1)
cD − t
2
(
c∗A
c∗X
)k
+
τ
2(k + 1)
. (A.14)
Substituting (A.12), (A.13) and (A.14) into (A.9) gives
p¯ =
2k + 1
2(k + 1)
cD − t
2
{
ND
N
(
cA
cD
)k
+
N∗X
N
[(
c∗A
c∗X
)k
− τ
2(k + 1)
]}
. (A.15)
Number of firms in the market
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From (11) follows
p¯ = cD − γ(α− cD)
βN
. (A.16)
Equating (A.16) with (A.15) yields the following expression for the N :
N =
γ
β
(α− cD)− t2 1(cD)k(c∗D)k−(cD−τ)k(c∗D−τ)k N
∗
{
(cD)
k
[
(c∗A)
k − τ(cD−τ)k
t(k+1)
]
− (cD − τ)k (cA)k
}
cD
2(k+1)
+ t
2
1
(cD)
k(c∗D)
k−(cD−τ)k(c∗D−τ)
k
{
(c∗D)
k (cA)
k − (c∗D − τ)k
[
(c∗A)
k − τ(cD−τ)k
t(k+1)
]} .
(A.17)
The expression for N∗ is symmetric:
N∗ =
γ
β
(α− c∗D)− t2 1(cD)k(c∗D)k−(cD−τ)k(c∗D−τ)k N
{
(c∗D)
k
[
(cA)
k − τ(c
∗
D−τ)
k
t(k+1)
]
− (c∗D − τ)k (c∗A)k
}
c∗D
2(k+1)
+ t
2
1
(cD)
k(c∗D)
k−(cD−τ)k(c∗D−τ)
k
{
(cD)
k (c∗A)
k − (cD − τ)k
[
(cA)
k − τ(c
∗
D−τ)
k
t(k+1)
]} .
(A.18)
Plugging (A.17) into (A.18) gives
N =
γ
β
(α−cD)c∗D
2(k+1) +
t
2
1
D
[
(cD)
k (c∗A)
k − (c∗X)k (cA)k
]
γ
β (c
∗
D − cD) + γβ τ(c
∗
X)
k
2D(k+1)
[
(α− cD) (cX)k + (α− c∗D) (cD)k
]
cDc∗D
4(k+1)2 +
t
4(k+1)DΔ +
tτ
4D(k+1)Θ
N∗ =
γ
β
(α−cD∗ )cD
2(k+1) +
t
2
1
D
[
(c∗D)
k (cA)
k − (cX)k (c∗A)k
]
γ
β (cD − c∗D) + γβ τ(cX)
k
2D(k+1)
[
(α− c∗D) (c∗X)k + (α− cD) (c∗D)k
]
cDc∗D
4(k+1)2 +
t
4(k+1)DΔ +
tτ
4D(k+1)Θ
,(A.19)
where
D =(cD)
k (c∗D)
k − (cD − τ)k (c∗D − τ)k
Δ =cD
{
(cD)
k (c∗A)
k − (c∗X)k
[
(cA)
k − τ(cX)
k
t(k + 1)
]}
+ c∗D
{
(c∗D)
k (cA)
k − (cX)k
[
(c∗A)
k − τ(c
∗
X)
k
t(k + 1)
]}
Θ =
[
(cX)
k (c∗A)
k + (c∗X)
k (cA)
k − τ (cX)
k (c∗X)
k
t(k + 1)
]
.
Price variance
The price variance σ2p is the sum of the price variances of domestic and foreign sellers weighted
with their shares in the total population of sellers:
σ2p =
ND
N
σ2p,dom +
N∗X
N
σ2p,exp, (A.20)
where the price variance of domestic firms is the sum of the price variances of domestic
low-and high-technology firms weighted with their shares in the total population of domestic
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τ
(
cX
cD
)k (
c∗X
c∗D
)k (
cA
cD
)k (
c∗A
c∗D
)k
1.0000 0.6900 0.7530 0.0739 0.1615
0.9500 0.6999 0.7674 0.0746 0.1633
0.9025 0.7093 0.7815 0.0753 0.1649
0.8574 0.7181 0.7953 0.0759 0.1665
0.8145 0.7263 0.8089 0.0764 0.1681
0.7738 0.7340 0.8222 0.0769 0.1696
0.7351 0.7412 0.8352 0.0774 0.1710
τ
(
cX
cD
)k
/
(
c∗X
c∗D
)k (
cA
cD
)k
/
(
c∗A
c∗D
)k
1.0000 0.9163 0.4576
0.9500 0.9120 0.4568
0.9025 0.9076 0.4566
0.8574 0.9029 0.4559
0.8145 0.8979 0.4545
0.7738 0.8927 0.4534
0.7351 0.8875 0.4526
Table 4: Impact of a 5%-decrease in trade costs on fraction of exporters and high-technology
firms
(t = 0.5, k = 2.5, γ = 0.2, S = 1, f = fE = cM = 10, ψ = 1.25)
firms, NDL
ND
= G(cD)−G(cA)
G(cD)
and NDA
ND
= G(cA)
G(cD)
,
σ2p,dom =
NDA
ND
∫ cA
0
[pDA − p¯]2 g(c)
G (cA)
dc +
NDL
ND
∫ cD
cA
[pD − p¯]2 g(c)
G (cD)−G (cA)dc. (A.21)
Analogously, the price variance of foreign sellers is the sum of the price variances of foreign
low- and high-technology firms weighted with their shares in the total population of foreign
sellers, NXL
NX
= G(cX)−G(cA)
G(cX)
and NXA
NX
= G(cA)
G(cX)
,
σ2p,exp =
N∗XA
N∗X
∫ c∗A
0
[p∗XA − p¯]2
g(c)
G (c∗A)
dc +
N∗XL
N∗X
∫ c∗X
c∗A
[p∗X − p¯]2
g(c)
G (c∗X)−G (c∗A)
dc. (A.22)
Impact of a 5%-decrease in trade costs on fraction of exporters and high-technology
firms
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